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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: EVIDENCE REQUIRED AND LIhUTATION APPLICABLE

When, in an 'action for malpractice, the acts complained of are clearly
incompatible with generally accepted medical theory in the field in which the
treatment is being given, it shall only be necessary for the complainant to prove

the irregular treatment in order that a prima facie case of malpractice be
established. Once this has been done by competent legal evidence then the
burden shall be upon the treating physician to justify the acts as proper
treatment. Malpractice to an ordinary person, and in common usage generally
imports "an improper treatment or culpable neglect of a patient by a physician
14

or surgeon.'
The case of Hammer v. Rosen 15 was an action for malpractice against
a psychiatrist as a result of certain acts committed by him in the course of his
treatment of a patient. The patient, suffering from a schizophrenic condition,
had been treated by the psychiatrist for some seven years. The cause of action
was based on the premise that on several occasions the psychiatrist had
"beaten" his patient. The beatings were established through the testimony

of three witnesses, but no expert testimony was offered. This action was brought
by the patient for damages as a result of injuries sustained; and by her father
for fraud and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the malpractice
action at the culmination of the patient's case. This judgment was affirmed by

the Appellate Division.' 6 The Court of Appeals reversed on the malpractice,
finding that the evidence as presented by the plaintiff constituted a prima facie
case of malpractice, which, if credited by the jury or unexplained would warrant a verdict for plaintiff. (Note: In the trial court a jury rendered a verdict
for the defendant on the fraud and breach of contract actions. This finding
was affirmed by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.)
Generally, expert medical opinion evidence is required in an action for
malpractice; and the lack of any such evidence in the present case was probably the basis for the dismissal by the trial court. However, expert medical

7
opinion evidence is not required to establish a prima facie case of malpractice.'
The acts complained of here were physical assaults upon a patient by a
psychiatrist, a course of action that the doctor himself admitted would be
"fantastic." In an instance where the acts of malpractice are within the
experience and observation of the ordinary jurymen, so that they may draw

their own conclusions, and are of such a nature that no special skills are needed

to understand them, the opinion of experts is unnecessary.' 8 This departure
from the strict notion that expert medical testimony is necessary to prove mal14.
1929).
15.
16.
17:

Isenstein v.

Malcomson,

227 App. Div. 66, 68, 236 N.Y. Supp. 641, 643 (1st Dep't

7 N.Y.2d 376, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
7 A.D.2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1st Dep't 1959).
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941).

18. Ibid.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
practice first occurred in New York in the case of Bensbn v. Dean,19 and the.
rule as set forth therein has been applied by the New York Courts ever since20
In a situation such as this, the average person through common sense could
determine that assaults on a patient such as were alleged here are incompatible
with any recognized and valid medical treatment, and therefore expert testimony
would not be necessary, and the defendant should have the burden of justifying
such acts. The amount of damages could be determined by the jury and would
be for injuries sustained, and pain, and suffering which flow from the tortious
acts.2 '
Defendant also contends that the malpractice cause of action is barred
the
statute of limitations of two years, and further that plaintiff is not enby
23
titled to an extension under Section 60 of the New York Civil Practice Act;
because although the patient was purportedly still suffering from schizophrenia
at the time the action was commenced, she had not been adjudged incompetent
and therefore Section 60 would not apply. The Court states that it makes no
difference whether plaintiff was legally adjudged incompetent or not if she
was in fact insane at the time of the commencement of the action.24 It would
appear then, that a judgment of incompetency will not be necessary in order
to receive the extension benefit under Section 60. However, as there was no
expert testimony that the patient was still insane at the time of the commencement of the action, it appears that the second argument of the Court in
finding that the action was indeed timely was better. This argument was based
on the fact that the course of treatment, during which the assaults occurred,
had continued up until 1955, the year in which the action was commenced.
Where the treatment, out of which the charge of malpractice arises, continues,
then the statute of limitations on the cause of action does not begin to run
25
until the treatment ceases.
PRESUMPTION

OF PERMISSIVE USE UxE R SECTION 388 (FoRmERLY SEcTioN

59)

OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFiC LAW

In New York, when permission to use a motor vehicle is in issue in a
19. Ordinarily, jurors would find difficulty, without the help of medical evidence,
in determining the xight of a patient to recover against his physician for malpractice based on acts of scientific skill, but the results may be of such a character
as to warrant the inference of want of care from the testimony of laymen or in
the light of the knowledge and experience of the jiirors themselves. 232 N.Y. 52,
56, 133 N.E. 125, 126 (1921).
20. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., supra note 17; Isenstein v. Malcolmsan, supra
note 14; Simon v. Frederick, 163 Misc. 112, 296 N.Y. Supp. 367 (City Ct. 1937).
21. Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E2d 330 (1955).
22. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 50(1).
23. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Art. § 60 provides for an extension of time beyond the Statute
of Limitations period, where a party, at the time a cause of action occurs, is insane.
24. Chilford v. Central City Cold Storage Co., 166 Misc. 780, 3 N.Y-S.2d 386 (Sup.
Ct., 1938) had taken the reverse position in construing § 60.
25. Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct., 1923); Gillette
v. Tucker, 67 Ohio 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).

